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I. INTRODUCTION
Four-fifths of all pharmaceuticals have been developed from natural
plant resources,' and native plant resources similarly play a significant role
in the development of new and improved crops.2
Yet, scientists agree that the vast potential of the world's plant genetic
resources is rapidly disappearing.' Most of the plants needed for future
development can be found only in biodiversity-rich developing countries.
Intensive utilization of these unique resources can lead to their irreparable
depletion. Thus, there is a continual conflict between the need for research
and development, on the one hand, and the need for conservation of
biodiversity and protection of traditional knowledge on the other.
Similarly, the local societies and those developing nations that
involuntarily give up valuable biological resources and the traditional
knowledge associated with them are often left without any compensation
from the multinational corporations who develop the new products. Thus,
there is also a continual economic conflict between the developing
countries, their citizens, and the multinational companies that develop new
products based on their native plant resources, often relying on the
traditional knowledge or local culture. In many cases, only the companies
receive financial gain and intellectual property protection.
Some refer to the acts of multinational companies as biopiracy. They
argue for restrictions on the use of native plant materials and for protection
of the traditional knowledge that guides their potential modem use. Others
reject even the term biopiracy and claim that restrictions will bury the
dream to find a cure for cancer, for example, as it could be hidden
somewhere in the rain forest and not be accessible for scientific research.'
Likewise, it is claimed that the idea of providing long-term native
communities with new property rights over their nonscientific knowledge
of biological resources would create an obstacle for research and
development.6 It would raise the costs of research and thus the costs of
new drugs and crops developed from existing biological resources.
Biotech and pharmaceutical companies would have to negotiate with rights
1. Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric ofBiopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519,
531 (2003) (CITING AFRICAN CENTRE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL STUDIES, BIODIPLOMACY:






6. See Heald, supra note 1, at 531-32.
7. See id. at 531.
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holders for the access and price. This process implies a myriad of different
8
problems and can end up with a refusal to allow access. Therefore, as
stated by Professor Heald, "the interest of the world community [would]
not [be] well served by the creation of new property rights" conferred to
indigenous communities.9
In practice, all of these discussions illustrate the actual conflict
between international intellectual property law and the rights of traditional
farmers in developing countries.10 Yet, many scholars agree that there is a
huge gap between the traditional knowledge and intellectual property legal
frameworks." On one hand, there are numerous protections available for
intellectual property rights (IPRs), and on the other hand, there are
inadequate, or almost non-existent, protections available for the traditional
knowledge that is possessed by indigenous communities and
misappropriated in the commercial markets. The latter category of rights
has never been fully integrated into the existing system of protection.
These matters are receiving increased attention throughout the world.
How these conflicts are resolved will have a great impact on international
agriculture, global food supplies, the pharmaceutical industry and
international trade.
In order to understand the scope of this article and the type of
biopiracy cases it addresses, a distinction needs to be made regarding what
exactly is being patented. "Patents protect the physical embodiment of
technological information or inventive activity - the invention - rather than
abstract thoughts."l 2 In the case of biopiracy, the most important issue is
not whether the plant itself is being patented, but whether the
"ethnobotanical knowledge" derived from that plant is.' Ethnobotanical
8. Id. at 531-32.
9. Id. at 532.
10. See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Shaping Society's Acceptance of
Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIc. L. 81, 106
(2001).
11. See Sumathi Subbiah, Reaping What They Sow: The Basmati Rice Controversy
and Strategies for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
529, 540 (2004); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge,
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 235-37 (2001).
12. Edgardo Buscaglia, U.S. Foreign Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in
Latin America, HOOVER INSTITUTION: STANFORD UNIVERSITY (Apr. 1, 1997),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846756.html?show-essay.
13. Zachary Hiller, The Promise & Peril of Trips, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 54,
56 (Summer 2009).
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knowledge refers to a "community's [traditional] knowledge about medical
and alimentary uses of plants."1 4
This article focuses on the issues of patentability of traditional
knowledge, the role of intellectual property systems in relation to
traditional knowledge, access to genetic resources, and the controversy
between "industrial" IPRs and the ones claimed by indigenous
communities. This article will not discuss the issue of the patentability of
life forms because this topic deserves independent examination. It is also
not the goal of this article to propose amendments to any existing legal
framework or to repeat others' appeals for revolutionary changes in U.S.
patent law. Rather, this article's objective is to find out how the traditional
knowledge can enjoy protection under existing law, both domestically and
internationally.
This article is divided into three parts. Section II provides a general
overview of the debate over the appropriation of traditional knowledge and
its further use in purely economical purposes. It also discusses some of the
existing views on biopiracy and bioprospecting. Section III examines the
existing legal framework, beginning with international perspectives, and
briefly describes the mechanisms available through the World Trade
Organization (WTO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
and the United Nations (UN). It then considers national laws. Finally,
Section IV discusses possible legal mechanisms for the protection of
traditional knowledge both at the international and national levels.
II. THE DEBATE OVER BIOPROSPECTING AND BIOPIRACY
A. Bioprospecting View: Pro-patent Arguments
The underlying goal of patent law is to give incentive to create and to
promote advances in technology.15 It was Thomas Jefferson's idea that
"ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement."16 Therefore, inventors
are supposed to receive a "reward" for the time, funds and efforts they
invested into creating something new." This reward is the right of an
inventor to exclude others from manufacturing, using, or selling of the
14. Philip Schuler, Biopiracy and Commercialization ofEthnobotanical Knowledge,
in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 159, 178 fn. 1 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., Oxford University
Press 2004).
15. See James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 271 (2003).
16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (H. Washington ed., 1871)).
17. See Gathii, supra note 15, at 271.
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invention for twenty years from the date the patent application was filed.' 8
Using this exclusive right, inventors not only can regain their expenditures,
but they can also profit from such a monopoly.19 Thus, there is an
incentive to create.
In this regard, the "bioprospecting" is viewed as a "win-win"
situation.20 Research and development activities are based on the valuable
knowledge of indigenous peoples and resources available primarily in the
Southern Hemisphere.21 Revenue is generated and this revenue is used for
further research and development. The developing countries in the
Southern Hemisphere benefit from new medicines and from improved
seeds that will increase yields and increase overall agricultural productivity
of those nations. According to this bioprospecting perspective, these
discoveries can also provide indigenous communities with new food
sources.22 Without bioprospecting these resources and traditional
knowledge regarding their use would otherwise be left undeveloped.2 3
There is also an argument that benefits generated from the use of
biodiversity can be invested in the "improvement of livelihoods of
indigenous and local communities, biodiversity conservation programmes
and bio-technological capacity building." 24 However, these points may
seem quite idealistic and thus provoke a lot of criticism.
B. "Biopiracy" Perspective
Recently, many legal scholars dealing with the issues of
bioprospecting, also known as biopiracy, criticize a worldwide system of
patent law and are especially indignant with U.S. patent law and the World
Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights agreement (TRIPS). 2 5 They argue that the modem system
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2010).
19. See Gathii, supra note 15, at 271.
20. PADMASHREE GEHL SAMPATH, REGULATING BIOPROSPECTING, INSTITUTIONS FOR
DRUG RESEARCH, ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING 5 (United Nations University Press
2005).
2 1. See id.
22. See Maggie Kohis, Blackbeard or Albert Schweitzer: Reconciling Biopiracy, 6
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 108, 108 (2007).
23. See Megan Dunagan, Bioprospection Versus Biopiracy and the United States
Versus Brazil: Attempts at Creating an Intellectual Property System Applicable
Worldwide When Differing Views Are Worlds Apart-and Irreconcilable?, 15 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 603, 619 (2009).
24. SAMPATH, supra note 20, at 5.
25. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1981 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal
e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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is based on so called "patent imperialism." 26 This is considered to be a new
type of exploitation of developing countries, their biodiversity, and the
traditional knowledge of indigenous communities by the developed
nations27 Dr. Vandana Shiva argues that "[fJive hundred years after
Columbus, a more secular version of the same project of colonization
continues through patents and intellectual property rights . . . The creation
of property through piracy of others' wealth remains the same as 500 years
ago."2 Therefore, patent rights are seen as a "tool that promotes and
elevates Western norms in a manner that necessarily fails to acknowledge
the value of traditional communities." 29
Under the biopiracy viewpoint, bioprospecting is viewed as a
"process by which the rights of indigenous cultures to their genetic
resources and associated traditional knowledge are replaced by monopoly
rights of those who exploit these resources." 30
Vandana Shiva, Ruth L. Gana (Okediji), Rosemary Coombe, James
Boyle, Jack Kloppenberg, and others discuss the so-called "Great Seed
Rip-off' - international conventions that grant plant breeder's rights and
allow "commercial plant breeders to use traditional indigenous varieties of
seeds, and 'improve' them via minor genetic alterations and then receive
patents in the varieties, eventually selling them back to the communities
that produced them initially." 31 Paul J. Heald, a law professor at the
University of Georgia, provides two examples of behavior by companies
that has been labeled "biopiracy:"
i) MegaPharmCorp seeks a new treatment for diabetes and
sends researchers to a remote rain forest where the
inhabitants suffer an unusually low incidence of the
disease. After many interviews with local residents, they
identify an enzyme in a variety of squash cultivated by
26. See Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural
Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 433, 467 (2006).
27. See id.; see also Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity,
Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997); Laurie
Anne White, Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property
and the New Imperial Science, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 211 (1998) (discussing
biocolonialism).
28. VANDANA SHIVA, BIoPIRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 2
(South End Press 1997).
29. Ho, supra note 26, at 468.
30. SAMPATH, supra note 20, at 5.
3 1. Ketih Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-
So-Brave) New World Order ofInternational Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 47 (1998).
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them, which seems responsible for the low rate of the
condition. The researchers return home, isolate the gene
that codes for the enzyme and mass produce a successful
and valuable patented drug. The company never
compensates any of the local residents.
ii) MegaAgriCorp is developing a smut-resistant strain of
corn and sends researchers around the world to identify
varieties of plants worth studying. In the highlands of
Mexico, they interview farmers who for hundreds of years
have maintained a strain with significant smut-resistant
characteristics. The researchers acquire several of the
plants and embark on a successful crossbreeding program
when they return home. The information acquired during
the interviews saves them thousands of research hours.
They do not share any of the profits earned from sales of
their new patented hybrid seed with the Mexican farmers. 32
There are at least two traits common to both examples. First, there is
a willful intent of the companies to acquire some valuable knowledge and
reap profits. Second, there is reluctance among corporations to share their
profits with donor communities. Moreover, these companies then exclude
others from using their "inventions" without obtaining a license. One
could characterize these practices as a sign of the companies' greed.
However, there are also external factors that push companies to reject any
relationship between its invention and someone's prior-art. One of them is
an existing system of patent law. Section III will examine this issue in
more detail.
C. Criticism of the Biopiracy Perspective
The biopiracy perspective also has its critics, with many believing
that say "[t]here's no such thing as biopiracy" at all.33 The proponents of
this idea argue that most corporations are acting in accordance with
existing international intellectual property law.34 Proponents also say those
governments that portray themselves as victims of biopiracy should
actually blame themselves for the failure to protect their biodiversity and to
impose effective limits on seeking, taking, and harvesting of commercially
32. Heald, supra note 1, at 520-21.
33. Jim Chen, There's No Such Thing As Biopiracy ... and It's A Good Thing Too,
37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 26 (2006).
34. Id. at 14.
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valuable species.35 Although this viewpoint is quite aggressive towards
developing and less-developed countries, it also deserves thoughtful
consideration as it presents some rational points.
As it will be discussed further in this article, the idea of sovereignty
over natural resources and biodiversity not only provides nations with
rights but also imposes some important obligations, which countries
sometimes forget.
Legal scholar Jim Chen argues that "[l]ocal governments, not foreign
bioprospectors, hold primary responsibility for environmental damage
attributable to the collection of biological specimens." 36 Chen provides an
example where "pharmaceutical commercialization" was blamed for the
"depletion of a rare plant, Pilocarpus jaborandi, used in traditional
medicine of the Kayapo and Guajajara peoples of Brazil." 37 His argument
is that the exhaustion of the species happened not only because Merck &
Company developed an anti-glaucoma drug from jaborandi, but due to
Brazil's "failure to control access to jaborandi in its natural range or
otherwise to regulate its harvest."38
A completely opposite example is the United States. Few, if any,
developing countries have the same approach towards biodiversity
conservation as the U.S. 3 9 Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)40 the
"taking" of any protected species is prohibited.4 1 The term "take" means
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."42 The Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 197243 (MMPA) was also enacted to prevent certain
species and population stocks from extinction or depletion as a result of
human activities." The United States has achieved an effective
enforcement of these laws.
In contrast, developing countries can raise an equitable argument that
due to their meager financial situation they cannot afford to develop and
enforce conservation or preservation programs comparable with the ones
that developed countries have.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Chen, supra note 33, at 13.
40. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2010).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2010).
42. Id. at § 1532(19).
43. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2010).
44. See Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, NOAA FISHERIES,
OFFICE OF PROTECTED RESOURCES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2011).
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III. EXISTING LAW ON PATENTABILITY
A. International Framework
At present, neither "worldwide patents" nor unified international
standards of patentability exist. Although many textbooks identify the
common international standards of patentability as novelty, inventive step,
and industrial applicability, "the reality is there is little consensus across
national systems on the appropriate content of a patent regime." 45 No
relevant international treaty "nor an international adjudicative panel or
court has articulated a binding, authoritative or definitive interpretation of
the key elements of a global patent system." 46 Even the international
TRIPS Agreement, discussed infra, is often seen as a "flexible document
open to many interpretations."4 7  Therefore, as long as there is no
"international law" on patents, the discretion to define which inventions
shall be granted patent protection falls within the domestic jurisdiction of
individual nations, which are dependent on domestic politics and
interests.48
1. World Trade Organization View
In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) developed the
comprehensive multilateral agreement on Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), but it merely "sets out
the minimum standards of protection to be provided by each Member."49
The aim of the Agreement is "to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and [to] tak[e] into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade."s As stated in
Article 7 of the Agreement, the objective of TRIPS is to promote
technological innovations, facilitate the transfer of technology, and, at the
same time, ensure "mutual advantage of producers and users of
45. Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is A
Communal Patent Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 163, 174 (2001).
46. Id.
4 7. Id.
48. See id. at 179-80.
49. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGAIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tripse/intel2-e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011)
[hereinafter TRIPS Overview].
50. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 25, at Preamble.
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technological knowledge. .. in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare."" As will be discussed, Article 7 can be interpreted to favor both
bioprospectors/inventors and indigenous communities since it clearly
requires the balancing of interests.
The minimum standard of patentability is set under Article 27.1,
which requires member countries to make patents "available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology
[without discrimination], provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step, and are capable of industrial application." 52
However, the TRIPS Agreement lists three exceptions to the general
rule on patentability. The first exception is for inventions contrary to ordre
public or morality.5 3 This "includes inventions dangerous to human,
animal or plant life or health or seriously prejudicial to the environment."54
However, as indicated by Professor Hamilton, the public policy on
biotechnology may vary internationally, as the issue of morality can be
interpreted differently around the world. 5 In some countries, "such as
India, [the] more fundamental moral and ethical issues concerning man's
ability to own living materials are shaping public policy on the extension of
intellectual property rights to agriculture and biotechnology."5' Hence, this
exception also provides member states with an opportunity to exclude life
forms from the patent-eligible subject matter.
The second exception provides that "diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals" may be excluded
from patentability.5 7 The third exception is particularly relevant to the
discussion of biopiracy because it allows member countries to exclude
"plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological
and microbiological processes."'8 The patent laws in Brazil, for example,
specifically exclude all life forms except genetically altered micro-
organisms.5 9 This rule makes it impossible for any person to claim patent
protection simply because he or she discovered a new plant or some new
properties of an already known plant. Article 27.3 (b) also includes a
51. Id. at art. 7.
52. Id. at art. 27.1.
53. TRIPS Overview, supra note 49.
54. Id.
55. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 89-90.
56. Id.
57. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 27.3(a).
58. Id at art. 27.3(b).
59. RICHARD GERSTER, PATENTS AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE




clause that demands that "[t]he provisions of this subparagraph shall be
reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement." 60 The review of this Article began in 1999,61 and in 2001 the
Doha Declaration was adopted.62 Paragraph 19 of the Declaration instructs
the member countries "to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity [(CBD)],
the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new
developments raised by members." 63 Thus, even though there is little in
common between the two documents, the "relationship between the CBD
and the TRIPS Agreement have become integral parts of the WTO
discussions."6
At the same time, "any country excluding plant varieties from patent
protection must provide an effective sui generis system of protection."
Particularly, it has been argued that outside of traditional intellectual
property rights, contract law, the law of misappropriation, and granting the
traditional knowledge holders property-like rights over their genetic
resources may also serve as effective means of protection.66
2. World International Property Organization View
Another international institution dealing with the issue of intellectual
property is the World International Property Organization (WIPO), which
is primarily "dedicated to developing a balanced and accessible
international intellectual property system." 67 WIPO also recognizes basic
requirements for patentability. First, an invention "must be of practical
use." 68 Second, it must be novel, i.e. have a "new characteristic which is
60. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 27.3(b).
61. See TRIPS: Reviews, Article 27.3(b) and Related Issues, Background and the
Current Situation, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2008), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips-e/art27_3bbackground e.htm.
62. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist e/min0l e/mindecl e.htm.
63. Id.
64. Jay Erstling, Using Patents to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 15 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 295, 309 (2009).
65. TRIPS Overview, supra note 49.
66. See Erstling, supra note 64, at 333.
67. What is WIPO?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what is wipo.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
68. IP Services Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents faq.html
#inventions (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
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not known in the body of existing knowledge in its technical field." 69
Third, the invention must show innovation that could not be realized by "a
person with average knowledge in the technical field." 7 0  Finally, the
subject matter of the innovation must be recognized as patentable under the
applicable domestic law.
WIPO also states that "[i]n many countries, scientific theories,
mathematical methods, plant or animal varieties, discoveries of natural
substances, commercial methods, or methods for medical treatment (as
opposed to medical products) are generally not patentable".72 However, the
definition of plant or animal varieties, whether they occur in their natural
form or with genetic modification, depends entirely on the legislation of the
particular country.
With regard to traditional knowledge, WIPO has suggested that it
could be characterized as referring:
to the content or substance of knowledge that is the result
of intellectual activity and insight in a traditional context,
and includes the know-how, skills, innovations, practices
and learning that form part of traditional knowledge
systems, and knowledge that is embodied in the traditional
lifestyle of a community or people, or is contained in
codified knowledge systems passed between generations.
It is not limited to any technical field, and may include
agricultural, environmental and medicinal knowledge, and
73knowledge associated with genetic resources.
WIPO has been long criticized for not requiring bioprospectors to
gain permission from originators or owners of the concerned knowledge.74
However, at its Twenty-Sixth Session in 2000, the WIPO General
Assembly established an Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual





73. World Intellectual Property Organization, Intergovernmental Comm. on
Intellectual Property & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
Consultation Paper: Recommendations on the Recognition of Traditional Knowledge in
the Patent System 5, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/I3/7 Annex (Sept. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo grtkf ic 13/wipogrtkf ic_13 7.pdf.
74. See Dunagan, supra note 23, at 609.
75. See Intergovernmental Committee, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
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At the Committee's first session, the Secretariat outlined specific
tasks that the Committee was to consider.76 The first task was "the
development of 'guide contractual practices' and model intellectual
property clauses for contractual agreements on providing for access to
genetic resources and benefit-sharing." 7 7 The second task dealt with "the
protection of traditional knowledge and its status as prior art in existing
patent systems."78 The third task related to the development of national
and international patent requirements, including the following: 1)
disclosure of the origin of relevant genetic resources; and 2) the evidence
of prior informed consent by donors. 79 These two initiatives relating to
disclosure and informed consent are the most controversial and lack any
consensus among nations.80 Section IV of this article will shed more light
on this issue.
Even though these are definitely positive and quite unique
international undertakings to obtain some control over bioprospecting and
biopiracy, the decisions by the Committee are not binding and serve only as
recommendations to the international community. Section IV of this article
will consider benefit-sharing and contractual agreement for access to
genetic resources in more detail.
3. United Nations View
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992," established a landmark document
in the sphere of biodiversity protection - the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD).82 Today, the Convention is the only binding international
instrument that addresses the issues of biodiversity preservation, rights of
indigenous and local communities and the use of traditional knowledge.
The CBD refers to traditional knowledge as "knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles." 83 Nevertheless, the CBD acknowledges that there is no one
internationally-accepted mechanism capable of solving the varying global
76. See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J.




80. See McManis, supra note 76, at 558.
81. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79
[hereinafter CBD].
82. Id.
83. Id. at art. 8(j).
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issues created by the worldwide use of biotechnology.84 Even worse, "no
one country or any particular user group has the best or perfect incentive
for creating one."
The CBD has a strong focus on protection of traditional or local
knowledge. Article 1 of the CBD clearly states that the objectives of the
Convention are:
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources,
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and
by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking
into account all rights over those resources and to
technologies, and by appropriate funding. 86
The CBD supplies member states as well as their local communities
with quite an effective means of protection of their traditional knowledge
and biodiversity. The CBD states that member countries should:
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their
wider application with the approval and involvement of the
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices
False"
Moreover, the CBD further provides that members should "encourage
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such
knowledge, innovations and practices."88
In order to implement the fundamental principles of Article 8 (j), the
CBD Conference of the Parties (COP) established a Working Group and in
May 2000, the COP decided to adopt the Programme of Work, consisting
of seven elements and seventeen specific tasks.89 The most important are:
to develop "[p]articipatory mechanisms for indigenous and local
84. See SAMPATH, supra note 20, at 35.
85. Dunagan, supra note 23, at 610.
86. CBD, supra note 81, at art. 1.
87. Id. at art. 8(j).
88. Id.
89. See Programme of Work, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,




communities;" to develop mechanisms for the "[e]quitable sharing of
benefits;" to develop monitoring mechanisms; and to review existing
national and international intellectual property instruments that may have
implications for the protection of traditional knowledge. 90
It is easy to question how these tasks and strategies can be realized in
practice. According to Task 5, each contracting party shall submit their
reports on "the current state of implementation of Article 8(j)." 91 The
effectiveness of this task is questionable. The fact is the number of cases of
biopiracy still exceeds the number of benefit-sharing agreements.
Article 15 recognizes that national sovereignty rights are applicable
when a given genetic resource is located within a particular country's
territory.9 2 In fact, the Convention was "[t]he first international treaty to
recognise state sovereignty over genetic resources." 9 3  As already
mentioned in Section II, this provision imposes important obligations on
the member states. For instance, the responsibility for the alleged depletion
of biodiversity through the intensive use of indigenous resources cannot
fall squarely on corporations. As long as national governments assert
sovereignty over commercially valuable species in their natural habitat,
they also have to provide an effective means of protection of those
knowledge and resources. In many cases national governments neglect
their responsibility. This fact gives proponents of the bioprospecting point
of view solid grounds for criticism of those who blame corporations.
Therefore, in the example provided by Professor Chen, Brazil itself is
accountable for violation of the CBD.94 According to Article 3 of the
Convention, either Brazil has failed to exercise properly "its sovereign right
to exploit [its] own resources pursuant to [its] own environmental policies,"
or has ignored its "responsibility to ensure that activities within [its]
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment."95
Additionally, it should be noted that Article 16 addresses access to
and transfer of technology and states that when traditional knowledge is
granted intellectual property rights, the access and transfer of such
knowledge must "be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent
with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights." 96
90. See id.
9 1. Id.
92. See CBD, supra note 81, at art. 15.
93. Kristy Hall, Bioprospecting: New Zealand's International Commitments
(presentation, The University of Auckland, New Zealand) (on file with the School of
Geography and Environmental Science, The University of Auckland).
94. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
95. CBD,supra note 81, at art. 3.
96. Id. at art. 16 (2).
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Furthermore, the relationship between the Convention, international
agreements on IPRs, and patent law is still unclear. Interestingly, "[t]he
only direct references in the CBD to IPRs are in Article 16 on Access to
and Transfer of Technology."9 7 As for the CBD COP, it has invited both
WPO and WTO to explore the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement
and the CBD. 98
Summing up, the CBD is generally characterized as having a bias "in
favor of the need to respect, preserve and maintain those diverse cultures
and indigenous peoples in their roles as conservators of biodiversity." 99
The reading of the Convention shows that its drafters emphasized the
superior position of conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity over
the competing interests of industry. 00 In contrast, the TRIPS Agreement is
limited to the protection of "industrial" IPRs. Therefore, due to the failure
of the international community to create a single, universal patent system
capable of addressing all issues - IPRs, biological diversity and the
protection of indigenous rights, the lack of cohesion between the TRIPS
and the CBD, the definitions of "novelty," "invention," "traditional
knowledge" and its role as a prior art fall under the discretion of national
laws.
The United States has not ratified the CBD yet, claiming that the
treaty would impair American intellectual property rights, and that it
conceives intellectual property rights "as a constraint to the transfer of
technology rather than as a prerequisite."' This position is widely
criticized by the international community, as every country except the
United States and Andorra has already signed and ratified the treaty.102
Currently, the CBD has 193 parties. 10 3
97. Mgbeoji, supra note 45, at 168.
98. See Convention on Biological Diversity, COP 4 Decision IV/9, P. 16, available
at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7132; Convention on Biological Diversity,
COP 5 Decision V/16, P. 14, available at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7158.
99. Mgbeoji, supra note 45, at 168.
100. See id.
101. Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property
and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.
QUARTERLY 255, 256 (1998) (quoting Convention on Biological Diversity, in 3 U.S.
DEP'T. ST. DISPATCH 423 (1992)); McManis, supra note 76, at 548.
102. List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://




B. Patentability Under Domestic Law
As John Golden and other scholars have noted, the patent system has
developed largely through judicial activity.1 04 As a prominent British
commentator observed, "readers of the Reports of Patent cases might well
reach the conclusion that the state of the law in this field depends on how
key words and concepts at any crucial moment strike the judge hearing a
cause or fit the line of reasoning."' 5 This interpretative gap can be
beneficial to either indigenous peoples or corporations in their dispute over
a suitable interpretation of "traditional knowledge" and other aspects of
patentability. In either context, the key concepts of the patent system are
significant. This section presents a brief overview of the requirements of
patentability under the U.S. patent system and discusses how the system
can favor biopiracy, while Section IV will provide some examples of when
the system has been effectively used against biopirates.
Under the U.S. Patent Act, there are three requirements that the filer
of a patent must fulfill in order to obtain protection of its invention: (1)
usefulness, (2) novelty, and (3) and non-obviousness of the invention.1 06
1. Usefulness and Novelty
Section 101 of the Patent Act requires that an invention is "new" and
"useful" in order to receive patent protection.' 07  "Usefulness" means
simply that the invention must be capable of repetition.'" This
requirement is considered the easiest to fulfill because of its low
threshold.109 Section 101 uses the term "new," while § 102 states that the
invention must be "novel."11 0 This may seem confusing, as the law uses
two different terms. However, the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals held that "[t]he word 'new' in § 101 is defined and is to be
construed in accordance with the provisions of § 102.""11 Therefore, those
inventions that are deemed "novel" under § 102 also satisfy the "new"
104. See, e.g., John Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability:
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 122-26
(2001).
105. Mgbeoji, supra note 45, at 175 (citing Richard Gardiner, Language and the Law
ofPatents, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 255, 256 (1994)).
106. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2010).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
108. See Mgbeoji, supra note 45, at 182.
109. See David Conforto, Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy: Redefining the
Biopiracy Debate, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 357, 366 (2004).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
111. In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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requirement under § 101.112 Section 102(a) further provides that "a person
shall be entitled to a patent unless - (a) the invention was known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent."1 13 Therefore, the "prior art" under U.S. law includes both
domestic and foreign patents and publications, whereas with respect to the
"public use" or sale it is limited solely to those that relate to "this country"
(the U.S.A.). It means that the prior "knowledge" or "use" of the invention
in a foreign country does not bar patentability in the United States.
Commentators believe that because U.S. patent law does not require
"absolute novelty" for obtaining patent (limiting all foreign "prior art" to
published materials) "waters down the novelty requirement.""14 While this
provision definitely encourages the importation of technology to the United
States,"' it clearly acts to the detriment of indigenous communities since
their knowledge is usually passed down from generation to generation
verbally.116 Some scholars have suggested that this one-sidedness of the
definition of "prior art" was traceable to the ancient case of the
Clothworkers oflpswich, where the court reasoned that:
[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade
within the kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption of
his estate or stock, &c. or if a man hath made a new
discovery of any thing, in such cases the King.. .in
recompence of his costs and travail, may grant by charter
unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or trafique for
a certain time, because at first the people of the kingdom
are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill to use
it."
In Gayler v. Wilder the United States Supreme Court explained the
necessity of having the "publication" requirement in the following words:
[I]f the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it
was already given to the world and open to the people of
this country, as well as of others, upon reasonable inquiry.
They would therefore derive no advantages from the
112. Id.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2010).
114. Conforto, supra note 109, at 364, see also McManis, supra note 76, at 565 n.85.
115. McManis, supra note 76, at 565 n.85.
116. Conforto, supra note 109, at 364.




invention here. It would confer no benefit upon the
community, and the inventor therefore is not considered to
be entitled to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is
not patented, nor described in any printed publication, it
might be known and used in remote places for ages, and
the people of this country be unable to profit by it. The
means of obtaining knowledge would not be within their
reach; and, as far as their interest is concerned, it would be
the same thing as if the improvement had never been
discovered." 8
Unlike the United States, the European Union considers evidence of
foreign public use in assessing the validity of its patents."'9 The European
Patent Convention clearly states "[t]he state of the art shall be held to
comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or
oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the
European patent application."' 20 Similarly, the Japanese Patent Act defines
prior art as including oral disclosures and use without geographical
limitation.121
In the United States, in contrast, the law makes it extremely difficult
to invalidate a U.S. patent when traditional knowledge originating from a
foreign county is involved.12 2 Indeed, "[i]t seems particularly ironic that
the requirement of publication is not imposed on domestic prior art in a
highly literate society but publication is demanded from peoples whose
knowledge has been orally transmitted."' 2 3
2. Non-obviousness or Inventiveness
In order to be patentable the invention or discovery must also be non-
obvious as required under section 103 of the Patent Act.124 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) provides that:
118. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850) (emphasis added).
119. Chen, supra note 33, at 29.
120. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, adopted at Munich, Oct. 5, 1973,
art. 54(2), 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 277; 13 I.L.M. 270.
121. See Patent Act, Act No. 121 of 1959 (Japan), art. 29 (1), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id= 138795 (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
122. Vincent M. Smolczynski, "Willful Patent Filing": A Criminal Procedure
Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1171, 1181(2010).
123. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 275, 283 (2001).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010).
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A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described [in prior art], if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.125
Thus, the "non-obviousness" is evaluated from the perspective of a
person having ordinary skill in the particular field of technology. However,
the distinction between "invention" which is something unexpected and
"improvement" that can be obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the
related art is highly subjective.126 As noted by Ikechi Mgbeoji, "[b]etween
the poles of the so-called 'workshop improvement' and 'invention' lies a
measure of discretion by the patent office."' 2 7
Moreover, it is claimed that the requirement under consideration is
also "the most unfair to indigenous populations."l 2 8 In this analysis, "prior
art" used to find if an invention is obvious also does not include any prior
unpublished knowledge or use outside the United States.12 9 Similarly, a
member of indigenous population from a foreign country cannot be
considered as a "person with ordinary skill in the particular art."' 30
Therefore, it is evident that application of these standards of novelty and
non-obviousness will make it almost impossible to invalidate some of the
patents on traditional knowledge.
IV. PROTECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
Some scholars dealing with the issue of biopiracy believe that no
special means of protection are needed for traditional knowledge since the
biopiracy shall be prohibited as a regular piracy under international
customary law.' 3 ' They substantiate this viewpoint with the "shift in the
125. Id. at § 103(a) (emphasis added).
126. See Mgbeoji, supra note 45, at 181.
127. Id.
128. Conforto, supra note 109, at 365; see also Lester I. Yano, Protection of the
Ethnobiological Knowledge ofIndigenous People, 41 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460 (1993).
129. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (2010); Leanne M. Fecteau, Note, The Ayahuasca
Patent Revocation: Raising Questions about Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 69, 75 (2001).
130. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103(2010); Fecteau, supra note 129, at 75.
131. See generally Winston P. Nagan, Eduardo J. Mordujovich, Judit K. Otvos, Jason
Taylor, Misappropriation of Shuar Traditional Knowledge (Tk) and Trade Secrets: A
Case Study on Biopiracy in the Amazon, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 9, 53-58 (2010).
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historic conceptualization of piracy."13 2 Indeed, piracy is an international
crime, the prohibition of which rises to the level of jus cogens (a
peremptory norm of customary international law) and constitutes obligatio
erga omnes (obligation towards everyone). 3 3  "Legal obligations which
arise from the higher status of such crimes include the duty to prosecute or
extradite . . . ." However, this concept is unlikely to be applied to
biological piracy. First of all, in this case, the term "piracy" has a
comparative meaning rather than the legal one. Second, in order to gain the
status of the international customary law, the norm has to be supported with
international practice and be recognized as law.'35  Currently, no
international practice exists and no country recognizes biopiracy as an
international crime under international customary law. Therefore, it is
more rational to consider other ways in which the existing legal framework
may be used to provide an adequate response to the misappropriation of
traditional knowledge.
All existing means of protection of traditional knowledge can be
classified into two main categories: "positive protection" and "defensive
protection." The goals of each of them "are not mutually exclusive."
The former provides benefits to the traditional knowledge holders by
"awarding them the profits from the commercialization of their
knowledge,"' 38 whereas the latter "grant[s] to the traditional knowledge
holders an intellectual property right which the holders can enforce against
others attempting to use their knowledge." 3 9  This Section will first
describe "defensive protections" (reexamination procedures and the
protection of traditional knowledge with patent), and then it will move to
the explanation of some "positive" methods (benefit-sharing agreements,
disclosure of origin, databases of traditional knowledge).
132. Id. at 54.
133. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 63, 68 (1996).
134. Id.
135. See The Statute of the International Court of Justice, May, 1947, art. 38 para. I
(b).
136. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1185.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Coenraad J. Visser, Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for
Traditional Knowledge, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 207, 212 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler
eds., 2004)).
139. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1185 (citing Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Traditional
Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Note on Issues, Some Solutions, and
Some Suggestions, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 81, 84 (2008)).
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A. Using Patent Law to Protect Traditional Knowledge: Reexamination
Procedures
The previous Section discussed the concepts of prior art, novelty and
non-obviousness, as well as the ways these concepts could favor biopirates.
This Section of the article will look at how these concepts can be applied in
order to protect traditional knowledge from being misappropriated and
patented.
The existence of "prior art" is an extremely important factor under
any patent system because, if proven, the "lack of novelty" and
"obviousness" of the invention are almost automatically presumed. The
"Enola bean" case is an example of this tight correlation between the three
pillars of the statutory regime of patentability. It is one of the most
discussed cases of when a patent was issued on a plant species developed
from the traditional knowledge of an indigenous group. 14 0 Larry Proctor,
the U.S. patentee, purchased a bag of beans from Mexico market in mid-
1990's.141 Then he planted and bred those beans over several years.142 As
a result, a particular strain of the bean that remained yellow throughout all
four seasons was detected. 143 Claiming he developed a new strain of bean,
Proctor filed for a patent.144 On April 13, 1999 the Patent No. 5,894, 079145
was granted. 146  This "new" bean was called "Enola" after Proctor's
wife. 14 7 Besides this patent on the "improved" variety, the "inventor" was
also granted a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate.148 Using his
exclusive right to the commercialization of the Enola bean provided by the
140. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local
Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 175 (2006); Press Release, ETC Group, Hollow
Victory: Enola Bean Patent Smashed at Last (Maybe) (Apr. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/node/683 (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
141. Press Release, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, U.S. Patent Office
Rejects Company's Patent Protection for Bean Commonly Grown by Latin American
Farmers (May 2008), available at http://webapp.ciat.cgiar.org/newsroom/release




145. See U.S. Patent. No. 5,894,079 (issued Apr. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.google.com/patents?id=vvsGAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&so
urce=gbs overviewr&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
146. CIAT Press Release, supra note 141.
147. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1172.
148. Erin Donovan, Beans, Beans, the Patented Fruit: The Growing International




certificate and the patent, Proctor then blocked the import of all similar
yellow beans from Mexico through the U.S. Customs Service.149 Mexican
farmers were required to obtain a license from POD-NERS, Proctor's
company,150 and pay royalties of six cents a pound for all yellow beans sold
in the United States.' 5' Consequently, imports of the Enola-like beans from
Mexico to the United States decreased by ninety percent.152
In December 2000,'15 the International Center for Tropical
Agriculture (CIAT), the Colombia-based agricultural research center,154
with support from FAO, sought to invalidate the Enola bean patent on the
grounds of obviousness and the lack of novelty, and filed a petition for
reexamination with the Patent and Trademark Office. 5s During the period
of reexamination, the CIAT provided evidence of six varieties of yellow
beans identical to the patented variety.' 56 Proctor countered that the Enola
bean was novel because it had a distinctive yellow color and because it had
not previously been grown in the United States.'57 However, on April 29,
2008, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences found the evidence
provided by CIAT was a sufficient reference to prior art. 58 The Board
held:
[T]he Azufrado Peruano 87 plant and seed disclosed in
Azufrado Peruano 87 reasonably appears to be
substantially the same as the claimed Enola plant and seed.
Both (i) produce white flowers, (ii) have approximately the
same physiological maturity time of 100 vs. 101 days, (iii)
show substantially the same growth habit of
semideterminate vs. determinate, (iv) show substantially
the same weight/100 seeds of 42 gr. vs. 43 gr., and (v) are
yellow-seeded cultivars .... The DNA studies performed
149. Id. at 121-22.
150. Id. at 121.
151. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1172.
152. Loma Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 219, 228-29 (2008).
153. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1172 (stating request for reexamination of the
'079 patent was filed in December 2000).
154. Mission, Vision, Values, CENTRO INTERNACIONAL DE AGRICULTURA TROPICAL,
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/AboutUs/Paginas/mision-visionvalores.aspx (last visited
Feb. 27, 2012).
155. CIAT Press Release, supra note 141.
156. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1173.
157. Donovan, supra note 148, at 125.
158. See Ex parte Pod-Ners L.L.C., No. 2008-3938, 2008 WL 1901980, *22
(B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 2008).
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by Pallottini were said to give the same DNA fingerprint
for Enola and Azufrado Peruano 87.159
Since there is "a sound basis for believing that the products of the
applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of
showing that they are not the same."',60  Procter "has failed to provide
evidence sufficient to rebut the Examiner's prima facie case of
unpatentability ... based on the disclosure of Azufrado Peruano 87." 161
Therefore, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
rejected the patent for lack of novelty and obviousness.
However, Proctor appealed the USPTO's ruling to the Federal
Circuit.162  The Court affirmed the rejection and stated that: "[o]ne of
ordinary skill in the art seeking to reproduce (and hopefully improve) the
yellow beans that Proctor brought back from Mexico would have done
what he did: plant the beans, harvest the resulting plants for their seeds,
planting the latter seeds, and repeat the process two more times."' 6 3 In
order "to reproduce the yellow beans he had acquired in Mexico ... he
followed normal and well-established agricultural methods and techniques
for doing that."'6 This fact proves the obviousness of Proctor's
"invention" "to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains." 65 This case proves the importance of evidence of
prior art (such as published articles and studies) in revocation of "pirate"
patents under U.S. law.
The "Neem tree" case shows how much the U.S. patent system is
different from the European system in this respect. Neem, a tree
indigenous to India, is well known for its medicinal qualities.' 66 However,
different parts of the tree can be used for numerous purposes.16 Many
applications have been known for over 2000 years since they were
described in Indian Sanskrit.' 68
159. Id. at *21.
160. Id. at *15 (citing In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
161. Id. at *22.
162. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1173.
163. In re Pod-Ners, 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
164. Id.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (2010).
166. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1173.
167. Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree: A Case History of Biopiracy, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pir-ch.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
168. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1173.
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U.S. patent 5,124,349169 and European Union patent EP043625717 0
have been granted over extracts from neem seeds used as fungicide.' 7'
Both patents represent a new way of extraction, which ensure an extended
shelf life of the product.'7 2 Indian environmentalists Vandana Shiva and
Magda Aelvoet, as well as the International Federation of Organic
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) have challenged the validity of these
patents.17 3 The two jurisdictions reached opposite conclusions.
The European Patent Office took into account all relevant evidence of
prior use supplied by IFOAM, regardless of whether it was written or not,
and revoked the EP0436257 patent held by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and W.R. Grace.174  Unlike the European patent body, the
USPTO upheld the patent "because the traditional uses [cited] were not
supported by adequate written documentation, which is required under the
statute for uses outside of this country."' 75 Therefore, in the United States,
it is not enough to prove the lack of novelty and obviousness;
documentation of prior art has to be provided. This is the most
burdensome part for patent challengers since the traditional knowledge is
almost always "passed down through generations, both by practicing the
usage and through word of mouth," 76 At the same time, many developing
countries have not developed sui generis systems of protection for their
traditional knowledge. 177
169. See U.S. Patent. No. 5,124,349 (issued Jun. 23, 1992), available at
http://www.google.com/patents?id=H34dAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom--4&s
ource=gbs overviewr&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
170. See E.U. Patent No. EP0436257 (filed Dec. 20, 1990), available at
https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number-EP90250319.
171. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1174.
172. Id.
173. Press Release, International Federation of Organic Cultural Movements,
European Patent Office Upholds Decision to Revoke Neem Patent (Mar. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.ifoam.org/press/press/2005/neem-patent-victory.php.
174. See Fritz Dolder, Traditional Knowledge and Patenting: The Experience of the
Neemfungicide and the Hoodia Cases, 26 BIOTECH. L. REP. 583, 583-87 (2007).
175. Dorothy E. Schmidt, Postcard from the Reality-Based Universe: "Wish You
Were All Here!" A Meditation on the Relationship Between Science, Intellectual
Property Law, and the Rights of Indigenous Populations in Plant Genetic Resources,
38 ENVTL. L. 315, 332 (2008).
176. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1173.
177. Sivashree Sundaram, Battling Bills, Beans & Biopiracy, 15 ALB. L.J. Scl. &
TECH. 545, 557 (2005).
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B. Protecting Traditional Knowledge with Patents
Professor Jay Erstling believes that "using the patent system
appropriately to protect TK can serve more to prevent biopiracy than to
permit it.", On one hand, providing patent protection to traditional
knowledge may bring a number of benefits to the holders of that
knowledge. Patent protection would provide indigenous communities with
the right to maintain control over their traditional knowledge. 179  The
benefit-sharing arrangements would become mandatory since everyone
wishing to gain access to and benefit from the knowledge possessed by
some indigenous group would have to obtain a license.'80 Patent protection
would also oblige "applicants for patents for inventions derived from or
based on [traditional knowledge] to disclose in the patent application the
geographic source of that knowledge and to provide assurance that there
has been prior informed consent to make use of the knowledge."' 8 1
However, on the other hand, the realization of the idea of granting patents
to traditional knowledge holders is quite questionable. According to
Graham Dutfield, the shortcomings of this approach can be seen from three
perspectives: substantive, evidentiary, and administrative.' 8 2
From the substantive perspective, all modem patent systems "treat
inventiveness as an achievement of individuals" and "require that an
individual inventor be identifiable."' 8 3 In contrast, traditional knowledge
184pertains to collective endeavors of the people of a specific territory. In
response to a WIPO Survey on the protection of TK, the United States
responded that "special intellectual property protection is [not] needed for
traditional knowledge" largely because "intellectual property . . . serves as
an incentives (sic) for future creative endeavors; by definition, traditional
knowledge needs no incentive for development."' 85  This statement
178. Erstling, supra note 64, at 299-300.
179. See id. at 298.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See Dutfield, supra note 11, at 253-54.
183. Id.at254.
184. See Dutfield, supra note 11, at 254-55; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND
EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON
FACTFINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
(1998-1999) 25 (2001) [hereinafter WIPO FFM Report], available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/partl.pdf.
185. Survey on Existing Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for Traditional
Knowledge, United States of America, Response to Question 27, 124,




unambiguously illustrates the attitude of modem patent law systems
towards traditional knowledge. These systems anticipate innovations to be
made in response to provided incentives, whereas traditional knowledge
within indigenous societies develops spontaneously in response to the
communal necessities.186 Moreover, the typical indigenous community
does not welcome the personal ownership of valuable knowledge; the
information is usually shared.187
From an evidentiary perspective, it would be problematic to prove the
existence of traditional knowledge as an invention because most patent
regimes require documentation.'8 8 First, in many countries the documents
will be required to prove the moment of invention.'8 Second, something
more than the applicant's oral testimony will be necessary to meet the
three-prong test, which requires an invention to be: novel, non-obvious and
useful.190 However, as already mentioned, the forms of knowledge within
indigenous societies often have no clear moment of innovation.
Knowledge in these societies is passed down from generation to generation
and thus it is almost impossible to separate the elements of knowledge that
have been created from those that have been derived from previously
known ideas.191 Therefore, it is difficult to prove that certain knowledge is
non-obvious and novel.
Sometimes the traditional knowledge may have some documented
evidence, but "it may not be available in ready and accessible sources."l92
In most countries, neither a patent applicant nor an examiner is required to
search for references of prior art in religious texts or other written and non-
written cultural sources.'93 Thus, as illustrated in the previously discussed
Enola bean and Neem tree cases, the burden of proof to show obviousness
and the lack of novelty lies with the party challenging the "pirated" patent.
From an administrative perspective, there are a number of procedural
requirements in any patent law that may represent an insurmountable
barrier for applicants such as indigenous communities. For example, to
obtain a patent in the United States, inventors must fulfill the many
requirements stipulated by the USPTO.19 4  The patent applicant shall
provide:
186. See WIPO FFM Report, supra note 184, at 25-26.
187. See Dutfield, supra note 11, at 245, 254.
188. Subbiah, supra note 11, at 543.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 543-544;
191. See id. at 544.
192. Id. at 545.
193. See WIPO FFM Report, supra note 184, at 36.
194. Subbiah, supra note 11, at 546.
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(1) the name and address of the specific inventor, (2) a
formal request for exclusive rights, (3) one or more
"claims" that concisely define the extent of protection
being sought, (4) a description of the invention, and (5)
any necessary drawings and collateral information that
better describes the invention, usually in scientific or
technical terms.195
In many instances traditional knowledge holders do not possess the
resources to fulfill all requirements.19 6  The application process is
expensive.197 Similarly, they cannot protect their knowledge against
patents brought by another.19 8 It is also questionable if the members of an
indigenous community can write their application and describe their
knowledge in technical terms as required by most national laws.1 99 All of
these reasons may bar local communities in developing countries from
even attempting to apply for, enforce, or defend against patents, unless the
country or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide some help.
However, bearing in mind the hassle associated with patent protection of
traditional knowledge, this practice has not gained popularity among local
communities, developing countries and NGOs. Rather they focus on
"positive protections" and try to make such mechanisms as the disclosure
of origin and benefit sharing agreements mandatory under international
law.
C. "Positive Protections" of Traditional Knowledge
1. Disclosure of Origin and Prior Informed Consent
Many scholars agree that the mandatory disclosure of origin
requirement and prior informed consent can be powerful mechanisms to
eliminate biopiracy. 20 0  "The disclosure of origins requirement would
compel bioprospectors to include information about the origin of the
195. Id.
196. See Dutfield, supra note 11, at 254-56.
197. See Subbiah, supra note 11, at 546.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See Tak Jong Kim, Expanding the Arsenal Against Biopiracy: Application of the
Concession Agreement Framework to Prevent Misappropriation of Biodiversity, 14
SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 69, 88-89 (2010); see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho,
Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and the Legal Protection of Traditional Knowledge: From
the Shaman's Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a TRIPS-Consistent Requirement
to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent, 17 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 111, 124-36 (2005).
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genetic resource and the source of the traditional knowledge in their patent
applications." 20 1 "[P]ior informed consent would require bioprospectors to
show proof of obtaining prior informed consent from the [traditional
knowledge/genetic resources] holders before being granted a patent." 2 02
Combined, these two requirements would substantially improve the process
of patent application examination, would make both national and
international patent systems more transparent and fair, and thus would
prevent "pirate" patents from being granted.203
Although some nations have adopted this set of requirements under
domestic laws, an international system does not mandate these two
conditions for patentability. 20 4 The incorporation of these principles into
the international patent system is vital for the harmonization of the two
most prominent international legal frameworks that influence the issues of
traditional knowledge and genetic resources: the CBD and the TRIPS
Agreement. 20 It has to be noted that currently, these principles may
contradict with TRIPS since they would allow the traditional knowledge
holder to challenge a patent that formally conforms with TRIPS'
requirements of patentability. 2 06 Therefore, the reformation of the TRIPS
Agreement is required, and is strongly advocated by the developing world.
A group of WTO member countries, which includes Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Peru, and Thailand,
has proposed an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement that would make
207disclosure an international requirement.
201. Kim, supra note 200, at 89 (citing Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked
Tongue in the Global Debate on Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are
U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for
Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 19
(2004)).
202. Id. (citing Elizabeth Longacre, Advancing Science While Protecting Developing
Countries from Exploitation of Their Resources and Knowledge, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 963, 999 (2003)).
203. See id. at 89.
204. See U.N. Comm. on Trade & Dev., The Conference of the Parties, Jan. 30-Feb.
3, 2006, Analysis of Options for Implementing Disclosure of Origin Obligations in
Intellectual Property Applications, 24 n. 41, UNCTAD/DTIC/TED/2005/14 (Dec. 22,
2005) (prepared by Joshua Sarnoff & Carlos Correa) [hereinafter The Conference of the
Parties].
205. See id. at 75-80.
206. See Kohls, supra note 22, at 132-33.
207. See Article 27.3b, traditional knowledge, biodiversity, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/art273be.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2012).
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Nevertheless, as some scholars argue, "any amendment to TRIPS is
unlikely due to strong oppositions from major and influential developed
countries, such as the United States and Japan."208
2. Benefit Sharing Agreements
An agreement between bioprospectors and the traditional knowledge
holders is another example of a "positive protection" mechanism.209 This
kind of protection provides benefits to both parties. The bioprospectors
benefit because they are permitted to access, own, use, and license the
genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 210  The indigenous
communities receive monetary and non-monetary benefits in return.21
"Monetary benefits [may] include access fees or up-front payments, as well
as royalties and milestone payments if the resulting product is
commercially successful." 212  Bioprospectors can also provide donor
communities with education, training, and access to scientific research as
non-monetary benefits in return for the use of their valuable
knowledge/resources.2 13
This kind of arrangement may work in concord with TRIPS because
the TRIPS Agreement "sets a minimum requirement for patentability that
encourages flexibility and private experimentation at the national and local
levels." 2 14  Benefit sharing agreements, by their nature, require
bioprospectors to acknowledge the source of the traditional knowledge or
genetic resources and thus "mandat[e] prior informed consent and a
disclosure of origins requirement without any inconsistency with
TRIPS."2 15
Despite the previously mentioned advantages of private agreements, it
is argued that they can also have weaknesses.216 First of all, there is a "fear
that genetic resources will be incorrectly valued"217 because the real value
of a genetic resource or traditional knowledge is not fully realized when the
parties enter into agreement.2 18  Second, corporations can avoid the real
traditional knowledge/genetic resources holders and form private
208. Kim, supra note 200, at 91.
209. Id. at 93.
210. See Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1187; Kim, supra note 200, at 93.
211. Smolczynski, supra note 122, at 1187.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Kim, supra note 200, at 93.
215. Id at 94.
216. See generally Kremers, supra note 201, at 34-37.




agreements with the governments of developing countries.2 19 The
compensation in this case may not reach those holders at all. 2 20 Finally, this
type of agreements between private entities is difficult to enforce
internationally. 221
Nevertheless, benefit sharing agreements are almost the only
mechanism in a global fight against biopiracy that does not contradict
either the CBD or the TRIPS Agreement and thus should be provided with
222more international support.
3. Digital Databases of Traditional Knowledge
On its face, digital databases of traditional knowledge are an example
of "defensive protection." However, they also have some traits of "positive
protection" as they ensure the traditional knowledge holders' rights over
their valuable resources. As a "defensive protection," the worldwide
databases "prevent the misappropriation of genetic resources by defeating
the alleged novelty and inventiveness claims in patent application."22 3 The
crucial point in this system is to "recognize the existence of certain
traditional knowledge as 'prior art' and are, therefore, considered
knowledge already in the public domain." 22 4 As a "positive protection"
these databases acknowledge and document the rights of indigenous
communities over their valuable knowledge and resources.
Several developing countries created powerful digital databases of
traditional knowledge. The most notable among them is the Indian
Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL).225  The TKDL is a
collaborative project between a number of Indian Government institutes
and ministries and consists of traditional medicine experts (Ayurveda,
Unani, Siddha and Yoga), patent examiners, IT experts, scientists, and
technical officers with expertise in ancient texts in Sanskrit, Urdu, Persian,
or other generally inaccessible languages.226 The TKDL web-site describes
the project: as follows:
219. Id. at 94.
220. Id. at 94-95.
221. Id.
222. See Kim, supra note 200 at 94-95.
223. Id. at 87.
224. Id.
225. See About TKDL, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY,
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng (last visited
Feb. 27, 2012).
226. See id.; see also Bio-piracy of Traditional Knowledge, TRADITIONAL
KNOWELDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/
Biopiracy.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
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TKDL provides information on traditional knowledge
existing in the country, in languages and format
understandable by patent examiners at International Patent
Offices (lIPOs), so as to prevent the grant of wrong patents.
TKDL thus, acts as a bridge between the traditional
knowledge information existing in local languages and the
patent examiners at IPOs.
... The project TKDL involves documentation of the
traditional knowledge available in public domain ... in
digitized format in five international languages which are
English, German, French, Japanese and Spanish.
Traditional Knowledge Resource Classification (TKRC),
an innovative structured classification system for the
purpose of systematic arrangement, dissemination and
retrieval has been evolved for about 25,000 subgroups
against few subgroups that was available in earlier version
of the International Patent Classification (IPC), related to
medicinal plants, minerals, animal resources, effects and
diseases, methods of preparations, mode of administration,
etc. 227
China is also developing its own digital databases of traditional
knowledge: the China TCM Patent Database 2 28 and the Chinese Medical
Literature Analysis and Retrieval System (TCMLARS). 229 The TCM
Patent Database is now offered in English and is available to the public.230
"The database includes over 22,000 patent records dating from 1985 to the
present and 40,000 Traditional Chinese Medical formulations."23
However, the critics of database systems say that the worldwide
digital databases are "long-term projects that require extensive financial
and administrative support from NGOs and governments." 2 32 Because the
majority of developing countries cannot afford to create and maintain
similar databases, their traditional knowledge will still be in danger of
227. See About TKDL, supra note 225.
228. See Brief Introduction of China Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) Patent
Database, CHINA TCM PATENT DATABASE, http://chmp.cnipr.cn/englishversion/help/
help.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
229. See Traditional Chinese Medical Analysis and Retrieval System (TCMLARS)
English Version, CINTCM, http://www.cintcm.com/e-cintcm/version.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2012).
230. Erstling, supra note 64, at 321.
231. Id.
232. Kim, supra note 200, at 88.
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misappropriation. Furthermore, they say that it is impossible to document
all traditional knowledge; therefore, much valuable knowledge will
continue to remain unprotected. 33 Finally, there can be difficulties for
governments in reaching a mutual understanding with indigenous
communities since they may try to "withhold or falsify their knowledge
because they believe that the traditional knowledge is sacred and should be
kept secret." 2 34
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of patenting traditional knowledge and genetic resources, as
well as all innovations deriving from them, presents a difficult problem
compromising of legal, economic, public and moral considerations.
Currently, when determining the level of protection, a legislator in a
particular country will most likely choose chose between two extremes: a
system that would favor "industrial" intellectual property rights, research
and development or a system that would have a bias towards the
preservation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. The choice
has already been made by each county based on what it has, where it is
situated, and what values and traditions it shares. These and other
historical and geopolitical factors have also determined the correlation
between the mentioned extremes internationally. The international
intellectual property rights system does not create any sustainable bridge
between the two. It highlights the dilemma between choosing an increased
protection of traditional knowledge which would harm research and
development and a strengthened Western IP law system which would be
detrimental to the rights of indigenous communities.
Such considered mechanisms as benefit sharing agreements and
disclosure of origin requirements would possibly create a system able to
mediate the interests of either system. However, many scholars agree that
the incorporation of such principles into international IP law is unlikely due
to the fact that international business is motivated by profit
maximization,235 and, having a strong support from the governments of the
most developed countries, can block any initiative by the developing
countries struggling for the reformation of the existing global IP law
system.
While the goals of IP laws may vary internationally, the ultimate
purpose of any government as well as the whole international community
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. See Mgbeoji, supra note 45, at 171.
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shall be the same: long-term sustainability of our planet, its biodiversity
and resources.
